Abstract. A set F of formulas is complete relative to a given class of logics, if every logic from this class can be axiomatized by formulas from F . A set of formulas F is L-complete relative to a given class of logics, if every logic of this class can be L-axiomatized by formulas from F , that is, every of these logics can be defined by an L-deductive system with axioms and anti-axioms from F and inference rules modus ponens, modus tollens, substitution and reverse substitution. We prove that every complete relative to ExtInt (or ExtK4) set of formulas is L-complete. In particular, every logic from ExtInt (or ExtK4) can be L-axiomatized by Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas.
Introduction
Canonical formulas were introduced by M. Zakharyaschev (for details and references see [2] ). They have been instrumental in studying intermediate and normal modal logic. The canonical formulas form a complete set of formulas, meaning that any intermediate logic or any normal extension of K4 can be axiomatized over intuitionistic propositional calculus (IPC) or, respectively, over K4 by canonical formulas. Our goal is to demonstrate that canonical formulas form the complete set not only for proving formulas but also for deriving, while using a Lukasiewicz-style calculi ( L-deductive system), the rejection of formulas. We will prove a stronger statement: one can construct L-axiomatization of every logic from ExtInt or ExtK4 using any given complete set of formulas.
The refutation system for various intermediate and normal modal logics were extensively studied by T. Skura, V. Goranko (see, for instance, [7, 3] ). In [6] T. Skura observed that in case of finitely approximated logics the Jankov formulas give the complete set of anti-axioms, that is the additional axioms that can be used to prove refutation of a formula. The canonical formulas are, in a way, the modified Jankov or, more precisely, frame formulas. It turned out that we can effectively use the canonical formulas for refutation.
In Section 2, we give the background information regarding L-deductive systems. In Section 3, we prove that every intermediate logic has an Ldeductive system defining it and having axioms from a given complete set of formulas. And in Section 4, we extend this result to the normal extensions of K4.
L-Deductive Systems
2.1. Refutation Systems. Commonly, we use a deducting system in order to prove a formula and we use semantical means in order to disprove a formula. But the rejection of a formula can also be established syntactically. For instance, by Modus Tollens we can derive that a formula A is refutable if we prove A → B and disprove B.
The idea, to include the rejected propositions into proofs can be traced back to R. Carnap 1 [1] . But J. Lukasiewicz was the first who constructed a deductive system for proving refutability [5] .
In general, there are two ways of handling the refutation syntactically: direct and indirect. To determine weather a formula A is refutable we can do one of the following
• derive in a meta-logic a statement about refutability of A ( L-proofLukasiewicz-style proof) • derive from A a formula B that we already know is refutable (an anti-axiom) and then apply Modus Tollens (i-proof -indirect proof, Carnap's way)
An existence of an L-proof entails the existence of i-proof. The converse is true under some assumptions (some weak form of the deduction theorem [8] ).
2.1.1. Examples of i-complete systems. Let Fm be a set of (propositional) formulas and Σ be a set of all simultaneous substitutions of formulas for (propositional) variables. Let ⊢ be a structural consequence relation, that is, for any finite set of formula Γ ⊆ Fm and any formulas A, B ∈ Fm the following holds
Given a consequence relation ⊢, we say that a pair of sets of formulas ⟨Ax + ; Ax − ⟩ is an i-complete system for ⊢ if 
We will assume that there is a class of models (algebras, matrices, etc.) M and for every formula A ∈ Fm it is defined whether A is valid in a given model M (in written M ⊧ A), or not (in written M ⊭ A). 
2.4. L-Inference. In a natural way, every deduction system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ defines an inference: if Γ is a set of statements and α is a statement, a sequence α 1 , . . . , α n of statements is an inference of α from Γ if α n is α and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} one of the following holds (a) α i ∈ Ax (b) α i ∈ Γ (c) α i can be obtained from the preceding statements by one of the rules. If there exists an inference of α from Γ, we say that α is derivable in S from Γ, and we denote this by Γ ⊢ S α (and we will omit index if no confusion arises). The length of an inference is a number of statements in it.
If ⊙ ∈ {⊕, ⊖}, then ⊙A is a statement with the sign opposite to
. . , α n , α is an inference of α from Γ, then, omitting from I all negative statements, the obtained sequence I + still will be an inference of α from Γ.
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of I.
Basis. If I contain a single statement α, the inference already consists of only positive statements.
Inductive Hypothesis. Assume that for all inferences of the length at most m the statement is true.
Step. Let I be an inference of α from Γ of the length m + 1. By the definition of inference, either α ∈ Ax ∪ Γ, or α is obtained by some rule from the preceding members of I. If α ∈ Ax or α ∈ Γ, then the single-element sequence α is an inference.
Suppose α is obtained by one of the rules. Since α is a positive statement, it can be obtained only by (MP) or (Sb). Let us consider these to cases.
A Case of (MP). Let I ∶= α 1 , . . . , α m , α. Suppose α is obtained by (MP) and α = ⊕A for some A ∈ Fm. Then, for some formula B ∈ Fm, the statements ⊕(B → A) and ⊕B occur in I. Assume ⊕B = α i and ⊕(B → A) = α j members of I. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m be the greatest index such that α k ∈ I and α k is a positive statement (that is, all statements α k+1 , . . . , α m are negative). Clearly, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Then, the first k elements I form an inference I k and I k contains both of statements ⊕B and ⊕(B → A). By the inductive hypothesis, we can omit in I k all negative statements and obtain a new inference I A Case of (Sb). This case can be considered in the way similar to the case of (MP).
and Γ ⊢ S ⊕α, then there is an inference of α from Γ containing only the positive statements.
Coherent and Full L-deductive Systems.
Definition 2.3. L-deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ we will call coherent if for no A ∈ Fm ⊢ S ⊕A and ⊢ S ⊖A. And we will call S full if for every A ∈ Fm ⊢ S ⊕A or ⊢ S ⊖A.
A coherent and full system will be called standard.
If A ∈ Fm is a formula and M is a model we let
If M ⊧ ⊙A we say that the statement ⊙A is valid in M.
We say that a model M is an adequate regular model for an L-deductive system S, if for every A ∈ Fm ⊢ S ⊙A if and only if M ⊧ ⊙A.
It is not hard to see that the following holds.
Proposition 2.4. If a given L-deductive system S has an adequate regular model, then the system S is standard.
In this paper, we consider only regular models. Let us also observe that in order to prove that a model M is adequate for a given L-deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ as long as all axioms and anti-axioms are valid in M.
Proposition 2.5. Let M be a model and S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ be an L-deductive system. If for every A ∈ Ax, M ⊧ ⊙A, then M is adequate for S.
Proof. The proof can be done by induction on the length of inference. Indeed, all rules preserve the validity of statements, i.e. if the premisses of a rule are valid in M, then the conclusion is valid too.
Logics Defined by L-deductive
that we call a logic. The logic defined by a given L-deductive system S we will denote by L(S).
We say that a logic L = ⟨L + , L − ⟩ is coherent, full or standard if the defining L-deductive system is coherent, full or, respectively, standard. It is easy to see that a logic L is coherent if and only if L
A logic is said to be finitely L-axiomatizable if it can be defined by an L-deductive system with the finite set of axioms.
Any
− ⊆ Fm and L + is closed under (MP) and (SB) and L − is closed under (MT) and (RS), is a logic. Indeed, L = ⟨L + , L − ⟩ can be defined by an L-deductive system system in which
Proposition 2.6. If S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ is a standard L-deductive system, the Lindenbaum matrix of M(L(S)) is an adequate model of S.
Proof. Due to Proposition 2.5 it suffices to check that all axioms of S are valid in M(L(S)).
The Theorem about Symmetry in ExtInt.
From this point forward we consider only the deductive systems S in which ⊢ S ⊕(A → (B → A)) for all A, B ∈ Fm. The meaning of the following theorem is very straightforward: if we cannot derive a formula A in a given regular deductive system, but can derive it from the some set of formulas Γ, then Γ contains a formula B not derivable in the system and, moreover, ⊖B and be L-derived from ⊖A. In a way, the following theorem can be regarded as a strengthening of Modus Tollens. Theorem 2.7 (about symmetry in ExtInt). For any L-deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ and any A 1 , . . . , A n , B ∈ Fm if ⊬ S ⊕B and ⊕ A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n ⊢ S ⊕B,
Proof. We will prove the claim by induction on the length of inference of ⊕B from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n . By virtue of the Proposition 2.1 we can safely assume that the inference consists of only positive statements.
Basis. Suppose there is an inference of ⊕B from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n of the length 1. Then, by the definition of inference, ⊕B = ⊕A i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, for ⊕B ∉ Ax, due to ⊬ S ⊕B. Hence, ⊖B ⊢ S ⊖A i .
Inductive Hypothesis. Assume that if there is an inference of the length at most m of ⊕B from ⊕A 1 , . . . ⊕ A n , then ⊖B ⊢ S ⊖A i for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Inductive
Step. Let ⊕B 1 , . . . , ⊕B m , ⊕B be an inference of ⊕B from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n . The cases (a) and (b) from the definition of inference can were considered in the basis of induction. Let us assume that the statement ⊕B is obtained by one of the rules. Due to this statement is positive, it can be obtained only by (MP) or (Sb).
The case of (MP). Suppose B j = ⊕(C → B) and B k = ⊕C, where 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m. There are two possible subcases:
. Then, ⊬ S ⊕C, for ⊬ S ⊕B. Note, that the sequence ⊕B 1 , . . . , ⊕B k is an inference of ⊕C from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n and 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Hence,by the induction hypothesis,
On the other hand, we can apply (MT) to ⊢ S ⊕(C → B) and ⊖B and obtain
And from (3) and (4) we can derive
Subcase (b). Suppose ⊬ S ⊕(C → B). Then, we observe that ⊕B 1 , . . . , ⊕B j is an inference of ⊕(C → B) from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n and 1 ≤ i ≤ m. So, we can apply the induction hypothesis and get
On the other hand, we can apply (MT) to ⊢ ⊕(B → (C → B)) and ⊖B and obtain ⊖ B ⊢ S ⊖(C → B).
(7) And from (6) and (7) we can derive
The case of (Rs). Suppose B = σ(B j ), where 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Then ⊬ S ⊕B j , for ⊬ S ⊕B. Also, note that ⊕B 1 , . . . , ⊕B j is an inference of B j from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
On the other hand, ⊖B = ⊖σ(B j ) and from ⊖σ(B j ), by (RS), we have
From (9) and (10) we have
Refutation in ExtInt
If Γ ⊆ Fm and A ∈ Fm, then by Γ ⊩ A we denote that A is derivable from Γ in Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC) with substitution (e.g, [4, Section 7.1.3]). Int + Γ will denote a logic axiomatized over Int by Γ, that is Int + Γ ∶= {A ∈ Fm Γ ⊩ A}. And Γ + A means the same as Γ + {A}.
A set F of formulas is said to be complete [10] (or sufficiently rich [9] ) if every logic from ExtInt can be axiomatized over Int by some formulas from F. An obvious characterization of completeness can be given by the following Proposition: Proposition 3.1. A set of formulas F is complete if and only if for each formula A such that Int ⊩ A there are formulas A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ F and A 1 , . . . , A n ⊩ A and A ⊩ A i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Clearly, if (12) holds, every logic from ExtInt can be axiomatized over Int by some formulas from F. Conversely, if F is a complete set, we can consider a logic L ∶= Int + A axiomatized over Int by formula A. By the definition of completeness, for some A 1 . . . . , A n ∈ F we have L = Int + {A 1 , . . . , A n }, from which (12) immediately follows.
Perhaps, the best known complete set of formulas is a set of canonical formulas introduced by M. Zakharyaschev (cf. [2] for definitions, references and history). For our purposes it is important only that canonical formulas satisfy (12) (cf. [2, Theorem 9.44(i)]) and, thus, they form a complete set.
By IPL we denote the intuitionistic propositional logic, that is, IPL ∶= {A ∈ Fm ⊩ A}. 3.1. Completeness Theorem. By Ax i we will denote the set of positive statements obtained from the axioms of IPC. And by Fm c we denote a given complete set of all formulas (for instance, a set of all canonical formulas).
We say that
Let us note the following.
Proposition 3.2. Assume A 1 , . . . , A n , B ∈ Fm and S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ is such an L-deductive system that Ax i ⊆ Ax. Then
Proof. It is not hard to see that any inference of B from A 1 , . . . , A n in IPC can be easily converted into an inference of ⊕B from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A n in S. 
Let us consider the Ldeductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩, where
i.e. axioms of S are statements obtained from the axioms of IPC and canonical formulas. We need to demonstrate that DS defines L. We will show
Note, that fullness of S immediately follows from (a) and (b). Thus, if S enjoys (a),(b) and (c), then S is standard. Also, it is not hard to see, that if S enjoys (a),(b) and (c), then S defines L. So, all we need to do is to prove (a),(b) and (c).
First, we will establish coherence of the system S. Proof of (c). Let us take a Lindenbaum matrix M(L) ∶= ⟨Fm, L + ⟩. By the definition of S all the axioms of S are valid in M(L). Hence, by the Proposition 2.5, M(L) is an adequate model of S and, by virtue of the Proposition 2.4, S is a standards L-deductive system and, thus, is coherent.
Proof of (a). Assume A ∈ L + . If A is derivable in IPC, that is ⊩ A, then, by virtue of the Proposition 3.2,
Assume A ∈ L + and A is not derivable in IPC. Then, by virtue of (12), there are such formulas C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Fm c that
Then, by virtue of the Proposition 3.2,
Recall, that by the definition of S, we have ⊕C 1 , . . . , ⊕C n ∈ Ax. Hence,
Proof of (b). Assume A ∈ L − . Then, by virtue of (12), there are such formulas C 1 , . . . , C n ∈ Fm c that C 1 , . . . , C n ⊩ A and A ⊩ C i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Let us observe that, due to A ∈ L − , one of the formulas
We already proved that system S is coherent. Thus,
On the other hand, by 14, A ⊩ C 1 .
(17) And, by virtue of the Proposition 3.2,
From (16) and (18), by virtue of the Theorem 2.7, we have
And from (15) and (19) we can conclude
Corollary 3.4. Every finitely L-axiomatizable intermediate logic L can be defined by a standard deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ with finite number of axioms and every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement obtained from an axiom of IPC or from a canonical formula A.
Proof. The proof immediately follows from the above Theorem and the finitarity of the relation ⊢ S .
Refutation in NExtK4
From this point forward, Fm will denote the set of all formulas in the signature ∧, ∨, →, ∼, ◻.
In order to consider normal modal logics, first, we need to extend the set R of rules by adding to (MP),(MT),(Sb) and (RS) the rules
Next, we need to establish that the Theorem about symmetry holds in NExtK4. Proof. Similarly to Theorem 2.7, the proof can be done by induction on the length of inference. We can repeat the proof of the Theorem 4.1 and consider only the additional case for (NS).
The case of (NS). Suppose B = ⊕ ◻ A j , where 1 ≤ j < m. Then ⊬ S ⊕A j , for ⊬ S ⊕ ◻ A j . Note, that ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A j is an inference of ⊕A j from ⊕A 1 , . . . , ⊕A j−1 . Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
By (RN), we also have ⊖ ◻A j ⊢ S ⊖A j . Recall, that B = ◻A j , thus, we can conclude the proof of this case.
Given a complete set of formulas, for instance, the set of canonical formulas, one can prove the following theorem (using the same argument as in proof of the Theorem 3.3).
Theorem 4.2. Every logic L ∈ NExtK4 can be defined by a standard deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩, where every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement obtained from an axiom of K4 or from a canonical formula A. In other words, every logic from NExtK4 can be L-axiomatized by canonical formulas as additional axioms.
And, similarly to intermediate logics, the following holds. Corollary 4.3. Every finitely L-axiomatizable logic L ∈ NExtK4 can be defined by a standard deductive system S ∶= ⟨Ax, R⟩ with finite number of axioms and every axiom ⊙A ∈ Ax is as statement obtained from an axiom of K4 or from a canonical formula A.
